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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-THE THREE-PARTY 
SALE AND LEASE-BACK-The so-called sale and lease-back device 
has long been the subject of judicial and governmental scrutiny.1 
The Internal Revenue Service has recently decided to begin a 
more active campaign of enforcement against a certain three-party 
variation of the sale and lease-back device. The structure of this 
variation can be best understood by considering the following 
hypothetical situation. 
Assume that A, the sole owner and manager of a small cor-
poration, approaches a tax-exempt charitable foundation and pre-
sents this proposition: A is to sell all of his stock to the founda-
tion at a price high above the fair market value of the business. 
The foundation will give A a nominal down payment, and the 
remainder of the purchase price will be secured by mortgages 
upon the assets of the business, with A waiving any right to sue 
the foundation for the balance due. After acquiring the stock, 
the foundation will liquidate the corporation and receive the 
assets. An operating company will then be organized and the 
foundation will lease the assets to the new corporation. The stock 
of the new corporation will be owned by individuals unconnected 
with either A or the foundation; 2 however, A is to run the busi-
ness under a long-term management contract with the new cor-
poration. The new corporation will pay eighty percent of its in-
come to the foundation as rent for the leased assets. In turn, 
ninety percent of the rental that the foundation receives from 
the operating company will be paid to A as installments in dis-
charge of the balance due on the purchase price. The payments 
to A are to continue until the entire balance is paid out. 
The financial advantages to all the parties involved in such 
a scheme, if each can obtain the desired tax treatment, are at-
tractive indeed. A, the seller, receives an inflated price and is 
l On sale and lease-back devices generally, see Cary, Corporate Financing Through 
the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. 
L. REY. 1 (1948); Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Lease-Back Trans-
actions, N.Y.U. 9TH INST. oN Fm. TAX. 959 (1951). 
2 Occasionally, however, A's accountant or lawyer will own the stock of the new 
corporation. 
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taxed at capital gains rates. The foundation invests nothing and 
risks nothing, but nevertheless emerges from the transaction own-
ing a profitable business after A has been paid off.3 The share-
holders in the new corporation invest relatively little and receive 
in return twenty percent of the income of the business while the 
corporation deducts the large rental payments. For obvious rea-
sons, the Internal Revenue Service is deeply interested in effect-
ing at least a partial destruction of this tax avoidance scheme. 
Typically, the attack of the Service upon this device has been 
three-pronged. First, it claims that the transaction was not a sale 
to the foundation, and that A remains the real owner. And, it 
asserts, since he is the owner, A must be taxed at ordinary in-
come rates, just as if he were receiving dividends. Second, the 
Service asserts that the foundation has either lost its exempt status 
entirely, or, failing in this, that it must at least be taxed as to the 
rents received from the operating company. Third, the Service 
takes the position that the operating company should not be al-
lowed a deduction for the amounts paid the foundation in the 
guise of rent, since these payments are not truly rent, but are 
indirect payments of dividends to the true owner, A. The pur-
pose of this comment is to examine separately the merits of each 
of these lines of attack, and to suggest a possible resolution of the 
conflicting interests of the tax.payer and the government. 
l. THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION 
The Service has suffered a notable lack of success in its at-
tempts to tax the seller at ordinary income rates.4 Given certain 
factual conditions, the seller will prevail. 
A. Change in Economic Interests 
The Service often argues that the seller has retained control 
of the business by virtue of being the manager of the new cor-
poration and by virtue of holding mortgages on the purchased 
assets.5 This contention has been accepted in only one case, 
Emanuel N. Kolkey.6 Three directors who had not been pre-
3 The foundation would claim that the rentals it receives are tax-exempt under 
§ 50l(c)(!I) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
4 See Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Clay B. Brown, !17 
T.C. 461 (1961); Estate of Ernest G. Howes, !10 T.C. 909 (1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d !182 (1st 
Cir. 1959); Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,i 60-146 (1960); Estate 
of James G. Hawley, !10 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,i 61-038 (1961). 
5 See cases cited note 4 supra. 
6 27 T.C. !17, afl'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958). 
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viously associated with the sellers were elected to the board of 
the new corporation. But these directors were extremely inactive, 
whereas the sellers continued to wield the real power over the 
business. Thus, although the presence of new directors would 
ordinarily demonstrate that control had been at least partially 
removed from the sellers' hands, here their presence was felt to 
be a mere ruse designed to disguise the actual locus of control. 
On the other hand, the government's position has been re-
jected in a number of cases.7 In most of these the seller has not 
owned stock in the new operating company. Such lack of owner-
ship is considered indicative of a change in control; moreover, the 
courts have further held that the fact that it may be the seller's 
accountant or attorney who owns the new corporation is not con-
clusive as to whether the seller has retained control8-certainly a 
debatable proposition. The boards of directors of the new corpora-
tions were usually composed either exclusively of persons uncon-
nected with the original business or partly of such individuals and 
partly of the seller and his associates. In either case control has 
passed from the seller, to some extent at least, and the boards have 
not been mere tools of the seller, as was the situation in Kolkey. 
And in cases where the sellers have withdrawn from their manage-
ment positions before the case arose, it has been difficult to con-
clude that there has been no change of ownership and control.0 
A second critical question in determining ownership is, nor-
mally, who bears the risk of profit or loss.10 In our hypothetical 
situation it is clear that the seller alone bears the risk of a decline 
in earnings and/ or value. The tax-exempt foundation puts up no 
assets. The stockholders in the new corporation risk only nominal 
amounts. Nevertheless, the courts have continually held for the 
taxpayer despite the fact that the seller alone bears the risk, and 
such holdings make it evident that the location of risk is not 
treated, in this context, as the important criterion of ownership 
which it is in other contexts.11 
The chance of gain, on the other hand, should continue to be 
instrumental in determining ownership. Since the price is usually 
a stipulated sum ( even though the payments are computed with 
7 See cases cited note 4 supra. 
s Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961); Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, 29 P-H Tax Ct. 
Mem. ,r 60-146 (1960). 
9 See Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. CI. 1961) (implicit); Clay B. 
Brown, supra note 8. 
10 See ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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respect to net earnings), an increase in the business's earning 
power and/ or value will eventually benefit the buying founda-
tion. An increased earning power means that the seller will be 
paid off in less time, but it does not mean that he will obtain more 
money. Once the seller is fully paid, the foundation will have 
the benefit of the increased value of the business, and the trans-
action, therefore, possesses one of the hallmarks of an actual sale. 
It is proper to question what the result should be if the con-
tract of purchase not only calls for a stipulated amount of money, 
but if it further states that the seller is to receive a percent-
age of any future increase in profits, i.e., a percentage over 
and above the stipulated sum. Here the seller will not only 
be paid faster; he will be paid more. And, since he also shares in 
the chance of future gain, it is quite conceivable that a court 
would be likely to find that ownership is still in the seller. Such a 
decision would, it seems, be justified, especially by the need to 
maintain some reasonable standard of judgment. Thus, where 
payments are computed with respect to earnings, the location of 
the risk of loss will not be determinative of whether a sale has oc-
curred; on the other hand, it is very likely that the courts will in-
sist that gain inure to the buyer only. 
The question of who will be the eventual owner of the busi-
ness is another crucial factor in determining whether a sale has 
occurred.12 If the seller has been entirely paid, or nearly so, by the 
time of trial, it is highly unlikely that a court would conclude 
that the transaction was not a bona fide sale.13 At the other ex-
treme is the situation where the seller has reacquired full owner-
ship of the assets. Such evidence can be quite damaging to the 
taxpayer, as in Kolkey, but it is not necessarily conclusive. In 
Estate of James G. Hawley,14 the new operating company was re-
organized after having met with financial setbacks. As a result of 
the reorganization, one of the original sellers was given all the 
common stock of the reorganized company. The other original 
sellers obtained all of the Class B preferred stock and the inde-
pendent group that had owned the original new corporation was 
given the Class A preferred stock of the reorganized company. 
The Class A stock was to be retired and thus the eventual owner-
ship was to reside in the original sellers. Nevertheless, the court 
12 See Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Estate of Cordie 
Hawthorne, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1J 60-146 (1960). 
13 Ibid. 
14 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1f 61-038 (1961). 
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held that a sale had occurred. Such a decision is certainly justi-
fiable where other facts indicate that the transaction was a sale. 
In the ordinary installment sale of a business, where the price 
is to be paid regardless of how much income the buyer earns, 
the seller may have to foreclose his mortgage because of a default 
in payment. The seller may then reacquire the business, yet the 
fact that there had been a sale would not be questioned. It is true 
that, in a situation like that in Hawley, the fact that the seller re-
acquired the business is more indicative of something less than 
a sale than in a more normal case. Still, it is but one factor to be 
weighed. In addition, there was one fact apparent in the Hawley 
case which made it nearly impossible for the court to say that, as 
to the petitioner himself, there had been no sale. The petitioner 
was the only one of the original sellers who did not obtain any 
stock in the reorganized business. Since he did not reacquire his 
part of the business, it was clear that, at least as to him, there had 
been a change of ownership. 
A third situation may exist, falling between the extremes of 
full payment and reacquisition of ownership. Where the seller 
has not been fully paid, yet has not reacquired the business, the 
courts must, to a greater extent, view the evidence subjectively.111 
The mere fact that the seller has not been paid is not conclusive, 
since it is still possible that the buyer will eventually own the 
business outright. Thus, it cannot be flatly asserted that the seller is 
still the owner. On the other hand, the seller certainly does not 
have all the rights of a normal creditor since he does not have 
an unconditional right to payment-he is to be paid only from 
such income as may be earned by the business. Despite this lack 
of any conclusive legal characterization of the seller, however, the 
courts have gone so far as to suggest that a record of steady pay-
ment indicates that the seller will, in due course, be fully paid 
and that the buyer is, therefore, the owner of the business.16 
B. Price and Method of Payment 
The price factor has not weighed as heavily in the decisions 
as have those factors relating to changes in economic interests.17 
In almost all cases the price paid was far above the fair market 
value of the business. The courts have felt this to be justified, 
15 See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961). 
16 Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 11 60-146 (1960). 
17 See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961); Estate of James G. Hawley, 30 P-H Tax 
Ct. Mem. 11 61-038 (1961). 
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pointing out that, since the buyer pays only out of earnings, it can 
afford to pay a price greater than fair value.18 The Kolkey case 
is the only one in which the extreme disparity between price and 
value contributed to the taxpayer's defeat. The price there was 
almost four times the fair value. On the other hand, the pres-
ence of actual price negotiations is viewed as good evidence of 
a bona fide sale despite the inflated purchase price.19 Arguably, 
however, the Tax Court, in Clay B. Brown,20 may have set some 
limit on how inflated the price can be, since it said that a "some-
what" high price is acceptable. 
The fact that it is possible for the seller to receive an inflated 
price and yet be taxed at capital gains rates on his entire gain has 
created a danger that the seller will be able to milk the past and 
future profits of the business at capital gains rates. Although this 
problem is aggravated by the courts' steadfast position that a sale 
either did or did not occur, and that the tax must be wholly at 
capital gains rates or wholly at ordinary income rates, nevertheless 
it is improbable that any court would accept a different theory of 
taxation. The milking problem is especially acute where, as in 
Kolliey, the amount of the down payment was quite close to the 
amount of the company's retained earnings. In that case there was 
a clear attempt to withdraw the retained earnings at capital gains 
rates while retaining control of the business. However, the fact that 
the down payment approximately equals retained earnings should 
not be enough to invalidate the transaction where other factors indi-
cate that a sale has occurred. Since the seller could have sold on a 
more normal type of installment contract, taking a down payment 
equal to retained earnings and paying tax at capital gain rates, 
there is little reason why the same result should not be allowed in 
an otherwise bona fide sale to a tax-exempt foundation. 
C. Business Purpose 
The existence of valid business purposes is evidence of a 
bona fide sale. Thus, in Estate of Ernest G. H owes,21 the desire of 
the sellers to put their estate in more liquid form so as to be able 
to pay death taxes was held to constitute a valid business purpose. 
Clay B. Brown, however, seems to indicate that the Tax Court 
18 Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. CI. 1961). A buyer can afford a 
higher price where he is obligated to pay only out of such profits as may arise than 
where he is unconditionally obligated to pay. 
19 Estate of Ernest G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959). 
20 37 T.C. 461 (1961). 
21 30 T.C. 909 (1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959). 
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will be generally quite reluctant to find a lack of sufficient business 
purpose (with the exception of Kolkey-type cases). Indeed, the 
court in Brown felt that the very nature of such a transaction 
insures that all the parties are possessed of valid business purposes. 
The fact that the price was high provided the seller with a pur-
pose for selling; that the foundation was to keep eight percent 
of the income initially, and was eventually to obtain complete 
ownership, gave it sufficient reason; that the shareholders of 
the new corporation were to obtain twenty percent of the income 
gave them a valid purpose. Since these motives will always exist 
in the typical case, it appears that very little difficulty will be 
encountered in attempting to show that valid business purposes 
exist. There may be, however, aberrant cases in which the factors 
involved in Brown are not all present. In Kolkey, for example, 
the extremely unrealistic price made it quite unlikely that the 
buyer would ever own the entire business; also, there was no 
third party receiving twenty percent of the income. 
The fact that the seller may have entered the transaction 
primarily to escape taxes will not be conclusive in the presence 
of certain other conditions.22 Examples of such conditions are, 
inter alia, the presence of good faith negotiations, and/or control 
in the buyer. But if the seller can show that he did not enter the 
transaction primarily for tax avoidance purposes, but rather for 
valid business reasons, as in Howes, he will have good evidence 
of a bona fide sale. The buyer's intent is more crucial. Where 
it is shown that the buyer intended to acquire the outright 
ownership of the business and that it was possible that he might 
succeed, the sale appears to be bona fide even though the seller 
may end up reacquiring the business because of the vagaries of 
a declining market for the company's product.23 The buyer's 
actual intent can be partially determined from evidence that he 
was careful to protect his investment24 or that substantial pay-
ments have been made.25 
The presence or absence of serious and determined arm's-
22 See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961); Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, 29 P·H Tax 
Ct. Mem. V, 60-146 (1960). 
23 Estate of James G. Hawley, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,r 60-038 (1960). See also Estate 
of Ernest G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959). But see 
Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), where the business was of such a speculative 
nature that it was apparent, at the time of the sale, that the market could collapse 
at any time. 
24 See Estate of Cordie Hawthorne, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ,r 60-146 (1960). 
25 Ibid. 
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length negotiations plays an important part in the courts' think-
ing.26 The existence of proposals and counter proposals, the win-
ning of some points of bargaining and the losing of others, and 
other evidences of hard bargaining are all most relevant in show-
ing a bona fide sale.27 The fact that the seller was genuinely con-
cerned over the safety of his position shows an intent to become 
a creditor rather than to remain an owner.28 Contrariwise, a fail-
ure by the seller to enforce his rights where a seller normally 
would will weigh heavily against him.29 
A usual corollary of bona fide negotiations is a full-scale ap-
praisal of the value of the business by the buyer.30 Such an ap-
praisal was made in most of the cases which have been won by 
the taxpayer, whereas it is significant that, in Kolkey, no such 
appraisal occurred. 
II. THE TAX STATUS OF THE FOUNDATION 
The position of the Internal Revenue Service with respect to 
the tax status of the foundation was disclosed in a revenue ruling 
handed down in 1954. 31 That ruling was based on facts identical 
to our hypothetical situation. The Service declared that the 
foundation would not qualify as an exempt organization under 
the forerunner of section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 because it was not exclusively engaged in charitable ac-
tivities. Also, even if the foundation did qualify as an exempt 
organization, its income would be taxed as unrelated business in-
come under the forerunner of section 511, and the statutory ex-
ception for rents would not apply because the foundation was not 
receiving rents, but was in reality enjoying a share of the profits 
of the business. Further, the Service asserted that the use of the 
income to pay the indebtedness and build up an equity was an 
accumulation of income within the meaning of the predecessor 
of section 504, and whether it was an unreasonable accumulation 
would depend on the circumstances. Finally, the entire trans-
action was felt to be of questionable validity for tax purposes; 
accordingly, the amounts received by the seller would not re-
26 See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961); Estate of Ernest G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909 
(1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959). 
27 See Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
28 Estate of Ernest G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), afj'd, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959). 
20 See Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), afj'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958). 
30 See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961). 
31 Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 128. 
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ceive capital gains treatment. This last position has been treated 
in the preceding section. The remaining three assertions will 
now be examined, along with a fourth possibility. 
A. Requirements for Exempt Status 
Section 50l(c)(3) establishes four requirements which must be 
met before an organization can be considered tax-exempt.32 Only 
two of these are pertinent to the situation under discussion. These 
are (I) that the organization must be organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or any one of a 
list of other similar purposes, and (2) that no part of the organiza-
tion's net earnings may inure to the benefit of any private in-
dividual. 
The first of the foregoing requirements has been considered 
in several cases. In Ohio Furnace Co.,33 it was held that the fact 
that the income received by the foundation was not immediately 
turned over to the educational institution for whose benefit the 
foundation had been established did not require a finding that 
the foundation was not being operated exclusively for educational 
purposes. The thrust of the reasoning was that the amounts used 
to retire the obligation incurred on the purchase of the business 
were used for the eventual benefit of the educational institution. 
The implication involved is that every dollar used to retire the 
foundation's indebtedness builds up the foundation's equity in 
the business. This idea was later overtly expressed in Knapp 
Bros. Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United States34 and was confirmed by 
the Tax Court in A. Shifjman.35 Clearly, then, the 1954 revenue 
ruling has been judicially repudiated insofar as the issue of opera-
tion is concerned. But the status of the law is not so clearly defined 
with regard to determining whether or not the foundation was 
organized exclusively for one of the required beneficial purposes. 
The Treasury regulations state that an organization is not 
organized exclusively for the proper purposes if its articles em-
power it to carry on, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of 
32 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 50l(c)(3), in describing the organizations exempt from 
taxation, provides: "Corporations and any community chest, fund, or foundation, 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, • • • literary or 
educational purposes •.. no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not par• 
ticipate in, or intervene in .•. any political campaign .••. " 
33 25 T .C. 179 (1955). 
34 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl. 1956). 
35 32 T.C. 1073 (1959). 
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its activities, activities which are not in furtherance of its exempt 
purposes.86 Under this regulation, the foundation in our hypo-
thetical situation would not meet the statutory test. It would not 
be plausible to assert that the transaction in question is an insub-
stantial part of the foundation's activities. Very often such foun-
dations are organized for the sole purpose of entering into these 
transactions. The regulation has, however, been rejected by the 
courts. In Commissioner v. John Danz Charitable Trust,37 the 
court ruled that it could look beyond the articles of incorpora-
tion and consider extrinsic evidence when ascertaining the purposes 
for which the foundation was organized. In addition to the fact 
that the benefactor ostensibly organized the foundation for the 
purpose of furthering certain philanthropic objectives, his record 
of ardent search for an existing organization that could suitably 
implement these objectives with the aid of money donated by the 
trust was indicative of the necessary charitable purposes. The 
Service contended that the broad powers given to the trustees to 
conduct businesses, and the fact that two businesses had in fact 
been conducted, showed a violation of the statutory requirements. 
The court responded by pointing out that powers are not pur-
poses and the existence of such broad powers did not necessarily 
vitiate the exclusively charitable purposes for which the founda-
tion was organized. Under the doctrine of the Danz case it is quite 
conceivable that the foundation described in our hypothetical 
situation would be considered as having been organized exclu-
sively for educational or charitable purposes. The purposes of 
the foundation are clearly to support such activities, even though 
it has the power to carry on business. 
The case of The Marian Foundation38 occupies a ground 
somewhere between the positions taken by the regulations and the 
court in the Danz case. The court in Marian felt that the word "ex-
clusively" means that the foundation must be organized primarily 
for the proper purposes; and the word "primarily" means that ac-
tivities which do not directly further the tax-exempt purposes must 
be minor in comparison with the exempt activities. The Marian 
formula allows the taxpayer more latitude in carrying on activities 
of a non-exempt type than does the Treasury standard. This is evi-
denced by the following chain of reasoning: The Service con-
tended that the foundation in Marian was not organized ex-
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c){3)·1(b)(l)(iii) (1959). 
87 284 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960). 
88 29 P·H Tax Ct. Mem. 1[ 60-018 (1960). 
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elusively for charitable purposes. Therefore, the Service must 
have felt that the foundation's non-exempt activities did not 
meet the Treasury's test of insubstantiality. The court, however, 
found that the foundation was organized exclusively for exempt 
purposes. Consequently, the "minor in comparison" test must 
allow more non-exempt activities than does the insubstantiality 
test. 
On the other hand, the court in the Marian case seemingly 
did not employ the liberal standards laid down in Danz. Marian 
appears to stand for the proposition that the manner in which a 
foundation is operated partially determines the purposes for 
which it was organized. The Service had contended that the 
foundation was organized for the purpose of engaging in the 
business of buying and selling real estate. However, the court 
pointed out that the foundation had acquired but six properties 
in the two taxable years in question, that the circumstances of 
three of the acquisitions were not those normally associated with 
the conduct of a real estate business, and that the circumstances 
of the disposal of the properties were likewise not characteristic 
of typical real estate operations. These factors prompted the con-
clusion that the foundation was not organized primarily to engage 
in a trade or business, but to obtain funds for a valid charitable 
purpose. It is certainly arguable, however, that these factors could, 
under the court's own test, be interpreted as being unfavorable to 
the foundation. Such modes of operation evidence the fact that 
the organization was not established primarily for exempt pur-
poses because the total non-exempt activities, regardless of whether 
they amounted to carrying on a trade or business, were not minor 
in comparison with the exempt activities. If the Marian court 
can be said to have used such an approach, the holding of Marian 
appears indistinguishable from that of Danz-the mere existence 
of a business does not necessarily preclude the foundation from 
enjoying tax-exempt status. But the more realistic view is that the 
Marian court decided that a determination that the non-exempt 
activities do not amount to a trade or business conclusively estab-
lishes that the non-exempt activities are minor in comparison with 
the exempt activities. Under this interpretation it seems clear that 
a finding of the existence of a trade or business will likewise con-
clusively establish that the non-exempt activities are not minor in 
comparison. The operative test thus becomes the presence or ab-
sence of a trade or business-far removed from the more liberal 
standard of the Danz case where, in fact, two businesses were car-
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ried on by the foundation.39 Regardless of whether Marian and 
Danz are reconcilable, however, it is unquestionable that the 
Marian standard is widely divergent from that asserted in the 
regulations. Although the non-exempt activities in Marian might 
well be said to be "minor in comparison," it would be obviously 
improper to say that they were "insubstantial." 
The flexible nature of the Marian test makes it difficult to 
assess the effect of that case upon the tax problems of our hypo-
thetical foundation. Where the foundation's sole purpose is to 
raise money for a separate charitable institution through rental 
of the purchased business assets, it is arguable that the renting of 
the business is its primary, or indeed, its sole activity, and that 
therefore it fails to meet the requirements of section 50l(c)(3). 
But where the foundation itself also engages in tax-exempt ac-
tivities, the proper treatment is not so clearly indicated. It is 
conceivable that the sheer quantity of non-exempt activity might 
be determinative in a particular case, regardless of what propor-
tion such activities bear to the total operations of the foundation. 
On the other hand, application of the dubious standards of the 
Danz case would seem to suggest that the foundation in our hypo-
thetical situation should enjoy exempt status. 
The second pertinent requirement of section 50l(c)(3) is to 
the effect that no part of the income may inure to the benefit of 
any private individual. This issue represents a reverse approach 
to the question of whether the seller made a bona fide sale. In both 
Ohio Furnace Co. and Howes the Tax Court indicated that, since 
the investments made by the respective foundations were sound 
in light of the circumstances existing at the time of the sale and 
since the prices were fair, the payments to the seller constituted 
consideration for the transfer of the business and were not an 
30 It should be noted that the l\Iarian court did not explicitly state that the tax-
payer was not engaged in a trade or business and therefore that his non-exempt activities 
were minor in comparison with his exempt ones. But, that this was the implicit holding 
is evidenced by certain statements made by the court. The court first stated its "minor 
in comparison" test. It then went on to deal with the Commissioner's contention that the 
foundation was not organized exclusively for exempt purposes, but was organized to 
engage in the trade or business of buying and selling real estate. The court asserted the 
foundation was not engaged in the business of buying and selling real estate and that 
it was organized exclusively for charitable purposes. The implicit conclusion is that the 
court meant that the foundation met the "minor in comparison" test because it was 
not engaged in a trade or business. It would, of course, be logically possible to say 
that the foundation could meet the "minor in comparison" test even though it was in 
a trade or business (i.e., to say "you are not in a trade and so you meet the 'minor-in-
comparison' test, but even were you in a trade you could still meet that test under the 
proper conditions''). But the opinion apparently says something different-it seems to 
say "you cannot meet the 'minor-in-comparison' test if you are in a trade or business.'' 
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inurement of income to the seller. But these decisions seemingly 
raise the possibility of highly inconsistent results where a separate 
action is brought against each of the various parties to a single 
transaction. In many of the cases involving sellers the price was 
well above fair market value; nevertheless, it was held that a bona 
fide sale had occurred. Yet, if the price is really as important as 
Ohio Furnace Co. and Howes seemingly indicate, it would be 
quite possible for a court in a later case against the foundation 
to find that, because of the inflated price, the payments to the 
seller were inurements of income, i.e., in effect, there was not a 
bona fide sale. Again, in a case against the seller there might be 
a finding of a bona fide sale based on business purpose, relin-
quishment of control, no chance of gain, etc. Yet, a separate action 
against the foundation might result in a finding that, because of 
an absence of evidence of arm's-length negotiations, or because 
the investment was unsound, no sale had occurred; even though 
the price was fair, the payments represented an inurement of in-
come to the seller. The possibility of such inconsistent results is 
an undesirable shortcoming of the practice of litigating and decid-
ing these cases separately. 
B. Other Relevant Provisions 
The Internal Revenue Service may also raise the question of 
whether the foundation is taxable as having received unrelated 
business income under section 511, as having received rents from 
a business lease under section 514, or as having accumulated an 
unreasonable amount of income under section 504. Before con-
sidering the statutory issues involved, it will be profitable to 
examine the congressional thinking behind these provisions. First, 
in dealing with unrelated income generally, the House report40 
stated that the problem aimed at was primarily that of unfair 
competition. Tax-free organizations were better able to expand 
their operations than were taxable businesses, since the latter have 
less profits available for expansion purposes. Also, certain exempt 
organizations had been using these "extra" profits to acquire 
business concerns. The purchases of such businesses were made 
with little or no initial investment, and the payments were made 
out of subsequent earnings-a practice which would not be possi-
ble if the organization were not tax-exempt. The report explicitly 
40 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), also found in 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 
380, 409-11. 
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stated that the tax was not to apply to dividends, interest, royal-
ties, and rents ( other than certain rents on property acquired 
with borrowed funds), since these were passive investments long 
recognized as proper for a charitable organization. 
The House report then turned to the specific problems pre-
sented by lease-back transactions. It was found that the use of 
lease-backs had become widespread, and that they were objection-
able on three scores. First, the foundations were not attempting 
to invest their own funds at a reasonable rate of return, but were 
simply trading on their exemptions; they were taking advantage 
of their exempt status by purchasing property which they would 
not have been able to buy without the exemption. The second 
objection was that lease-back arrangements, if not checked, could 
conceivably cause the great bulk of commercial and industrial 
real estate to end up in the hands of these foundations in the not 
too far distant future. Third, lease-backs were objectionable be-
cause the exempt foundations were, in effect, selling a part of 
their exemption by offering a higher purchase price than the 
normal taxable entity could pay. The report then went on to 
point out that the tax would apply both to cases where the lessee 
is the vendor, which is typical of the general lease-back arrange-
ment, and to cases where the vendor is not the lessee (such as in 
our hypothetical situation). Hence, the tax would apply to varia-
tions which raise the same anti-competitive problems as the stand-
ard lease-back arrangement. 
The House report also dealt with the problem of accumulated 
investment income. Many charitable foundations were not 
promptly distributing exempt income for charitable purposes, and 
the time at which the ultimate recipient could expect to receive 
the income was often extremely remote. The committee felt the 
exemption should be restricted to that portion of the income dis-
tributed to the ultimate recipient as it is received by the exempt 
organization. Therefore, undistributed income consisting of in-
terest, dividends, rents, royalties, etc., was to be subject to tax. 
However, the tax was not to apply to unrelated income already 
taxed under the other provisions of the bill. 
The foregoing seems to indicate with reasonable certainty that 
Congress intended to tax the type of foundation contemplated 
in our hypothetical situation. The transaction enables the founda-
tion to expand more easily than taxable entities. There is no 
doubt that the foundation would be trading on its exemption. 
It would also be selling part of its exemption by offering a high 
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purchase price, thus enabling the foundation to gain control of 
a good piece of industrial real estate. And, certainly, the ultimate 
recipient would not be obtaining the money as it is earned. 
The statutory issues, however, are less easily resolved. The 
Commissioner's ruling stated that the foundation would be tax-
able as to its unrelated business income.41 Clearly, amounts re-
ceived from the rental of real property (and the personalty 
attached) are exempt from the reach of section 511.42 The Com-
missioner contended, however, that the foundation is not receiv-
ing rents but is in reality obtaining a share of the profits. This 
proposition must be based on the conclusion that in fact it is the 
foundation which owns the operating business. Three arguments 
militate against such a conclusion. First, the operating company, 
which is earning the income, is owned by individuals who are 
entirely distinct from the foundation. Secondly, the House report 
calls the income received by the foundation "rentals," and the 
word "rentals," when considered in light of the circumstances 
of the House report, implies that the foundation is the owner of 
the assets, but not of the business. Lastly, the Service, in cases 
wherein the seller's tax liability was in dispute, claimed that the 
seller was the owner of the business. The Service thus takes al-
ternative positions depending on whose tax liability is in question. 
It is quite conceivable that the Service could persuade a court 
that the seller is the owner in a case against the seller, and that 
the foundation is the owner in a case against the foundation-a 
result which could be avoided by consolidating the cases for trial. 
Ultimately, however, since it is clear that the foundation is re-
ceiving rents, it should be equally clear that it cannot be reached 
under section 511.43 
On the other hand, the foundation should be reached under 
section 514 if the lease to the operating company is for a period 
of longer than five years.44 The only major interpretative problem 
involved here is the question of whether the foundation is deriving 
41 Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 128. 
42 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 512(b)(3), states that unrelated business income does not 
include rents from real property or the personal property leased with the real property. 
43 The type of income received by the foundation falls within the meaning of "rents" 
as that word is used in the statute. The Senate report states, "The term 'rents from real 
property' does not include income from the operation of a hotel but does include rents 
derived from a lease of the hotel itself." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 
also found in 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 483, 560. 
44 The effect of § 514, in this regard, is to establish when rents derived from a lease 
will be taxed as unrelated business income. Rents derived from leases of less than five 
years' duration are exempted. 
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the income from a trade or business.45 This issue has been litigated 
under other related sections, but the rationale of those cases ap-
plies to section 514. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Employees' Retire-
ment Fund46 involved facts analogous to our hypothetical situa-
tion. A trust purchased certain machines with borrowed money 
and then leased these machines to a manufacturing company. The 
court concluded that the rental income was received from a busi-
ness activity. The court pointed to the following factors as indicat-
ing that the taxpayer was engaged in a business: (I) the ma-
chines would produce no income unless rented, used, or sold; 
(2) a great amount of money was invested; (3) a loan was obtained 
to finance the purchase; and (4) the lease covered many years. All 
of these factors, except the loan, are present in our hypothetical 
situation. The court also felt that the leasing of even one piece of 
improved real estate might amount to carrying on a trade or 
business. Clearly, then, the foundation in our hypothetical situa-
tion should be taxed under section 514 since it meets the other 
requirements of the section as well as the trade or business require-
ment. 47 
There has, however, been a variation from our hypothetical 
situation which serves to take the foundation beyond the reach 
of section 514. In the hypothetical transaction the new company 
takes a long-term lease of the assets. In the variation, the lease is 
for a period of less than five years and thus not subject to section 
514. Nevertheless, it is clear that this variation possesses the at-
tributes specifically condemned by Congress: the foundation is 
trading on its exemption; it is selling part of its exemption; there 
is an anti-competitive element present; the foundation is not in-
vesting its own funds, etc. It is possible, however, that section 504 
411 It is clear that, if the foundation is receiving this income from a trade or business, 
it is receiving it from an unrelated trade or business. The House report said, at 459: 
"In general, rents from real property (including personalty leased therewith) . . . are 
also excluded. However, certain rent received from a Supplement U lease •.. is included 
as an item of gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business." H.R. REP. No. 
21119, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), also found in 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 380, 459. 
46 116 T.C. 96 (1961). This case involved an interpretation of the unrelated trade or 
business requirement of § 5lll(b). 
47 Section 514 requires that a certain percentage of rents derived from a business 
lease be included in the organization's gross income as income from an unrelated trade 
or business if (I) the lease is given on property on which there is a business lease 
indebtedness, and (2) the lease is for longer than five years. It has been shown above 
that the rents received by the foundation are of the type Congress desired to tax and 
that the foundation is engaged in an unrelated trade or business. A business lease 
indebtedness exists where the lessor, as in our hypothetical case, incurs indebtedness in 
order to acquire the property. And our hypothetical situation does not fit into any of the 
statutory exceptions. 
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could be employed to close the loophole which exists for these 
short-term transactions. 
Insofar as is pertinent here, section 504 provides, in effect, 
that if the amounts accumulated out of income and not distributed 
are either unreasonable in amount or duration with respect to the 
exempt purposes of the foundation, or are used in substantial 
amounts for purposes other than those constituting the bases of 
the exemption, then exemption will be denied. This provision was 
involved in A. Shiffman.48 In that case, the foundation bought real 
estate which it then leased. It had taken a loan to finance the 
purchase price and the loan was repaid primarily from its net 
income. The court assumed, but did not decide, that the use of 
the income to repay indebtedness constituted an accumulation of 
income. The court said that, since this use of income had been for 
exclusively charitable purposes, the accumulation was neither 
unreasonable nor used for purposes not constituting the bases of 
the exemption. This decision flies in the face of congressional 
intent. It will be remembered that the congressional report clearly 
stated that it was dealing with cases in which the time at which 
the ultimate recipient of the income will benefit is extremely re-
mote. The committee further said that an exemption should be 
allowed only where the charitable foundation distributes the in-
come to the ultimate recipient as it is earned. In Shiffman, as in 
our hypothetical situation, the charity would not receive the 
income as it is earned by the foundation and would not expect 
to benefit directly and substantially until a remote date. The 
Shiffman decision is especially unfortunate since it leaves open 
the tax loophole created by the five-year limitation of section 514. 
It would be far better to hold that the payments to the seller 
constitute an accumulation of income which, in substantial 
amount, is not being used to foster the purposes for which the 
foundation was granted an exemption. 
III. THE OPERATING CoMPANYs TAX SITUATION 
There are two possible lines of attack by which the Service 
might prevent the operating company from enjoying a rental 
deduction for the eighty percent of its income which is paid to 
the foundation. The first would be to assert that the rentals are 
not allowable as deductions under section 162.49 A treatment of 
48 32 T.C. 1073 (1959). 
49 Section 162 deals with deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred 
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the ramifications of such an argument is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. A second approach would be to claim that the amounts 
transferred to the foundation are payments of a share of the profits 
rather than rentals. However, even if this approach was success-
ful, the Service would still be faced with the problem of showing 
that the foundation, and not the seller, is the owner of the busi-
ness. The difficulty of meeting this burden has been demonstrated 
in the foregoing paragraphs. Moreover, the use of this approach 
once again raises the possibility of widely divergent results in 
separate trials involving the same transaction. 
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION 
The foregoing discussion suggests that Congress deems lease-
back transactions to be objectionable where they are entered into 
by charitable foundations. The congressional response to these 
lease-backs was to levy a tax on the foundation's unrelated busi-
ness income. As a practical matter, such a tax, if wholly effective, 
would eliminate the entire problem: the transaction is of no value 
unless all the parties obtain the tax treatment they desire, and it 
will not be entered into where the foundation's unrelated business 
income is subject to tax. Conversely, the transaction can be a lucra-
tive one where the foundation is not taxed-as is the case now 
where the lease is of less than a five-year duration. It is difficult to 
understand why a five-year limitation was placed on section 514. 
The only clue provided by the congressional reports and committee 
hearings is that the typical lease-back arrangement involved 
rather long leases at the time the forerunners of section 511 and 
section 514 were originally enacted.50 Today, however, the lease-
back problem has shifted to the setting of shorter-term leases, in 
an attempt to take advantage of the five-year provision of section 
514. Furthermore, the Shifjman case has made it impossible to 
attack these transactions under section 504. The tax.payers will 
be able to circumvent the present statutory law as long as the 
Shifjman doctrine is maintained. It has been previously shown 
that the Shifjman rationale is dubious and should be judicially 
repudiated. Such a repudiation would certainly strengthen the 
existing law and preserve the integrity of sections 511 and 514. 
in carrying on a trade or business. It jg arguable that a rental amounting to 80% of 
the profits is neither ordinary nor necessary. 
50 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Hearings on Revenue RevLsion of 
1950 Before the House Committee on Ways & Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). 
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Without such a judicial turnabout, sections 511 and 514, as 
presently written and construed, cannot be the effective com-
batants of anti-competitive practices which they were designed 
to be. In the absence of a judicial overthrow of Shiffman, it may 
become necessary for Congress to remove the five-year limitation 
from section 514. Perhaps such action would be desirable even 
if the judiciary were to respond to the need. Judicial overthrow 
is often a tentative solution at best, while legislation has the ad-
vantage of being more definite and certain. Moreover, so long as 
the five-year limitation remains, some courts may feel they are 
not justified in avoiding this limitation by the back-door route 
of section 504. This possibility is enhanced by the fact that the 
reason for the five-year limitation is so vague and uncertain. This 
uncertainty may cause courts to feel that there must have been 
some sound reason for the provision and that it should not be 
vitiated by the use of section 504. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
present use of the short-term lease involves the same problems 
which originally motivated congressional action. Therefore, it 
seems likely that Congress would desire to close the anti-competi-
tive loophole left in the original statutory provisions. 
Lawrence R. Velvel, S.Ed. 
